Debunking the “Hard Problem of Consciousness”

The phrase “hard problem of consciousness,” introduced by philosopher David Chalmers in 1995, encapsulates the challenge of understanding why and how subjective experiences, or “qualia,” emerge from the brain’s physical processes. While we have made significant strides in understanding brain function and its correlation with mental states, the hard problem specifically addresses the subjective quality of consciousness — what it feels like to experience pain, see the color red, or feel joy.

However, the notion of the “hard problem of consciousness” is often perceived as difficult due to a deliberate mystification that exaggerates the uniqueness of human consciousness. I feel that this has to do with the desire to smuggle back in the notion of a soul, a ghost-in-the-machine, or the homunculus. The belief in an inner observer or experiencer, however, would not help us because that leads to the problem of infinite regress — who is going to observe inside the observer? By reframing this so-called “hard problem,” we can clarify and strengthen our understanding of consciousness through five key points:

1. Experience Is Observer-Dependent

Different species experience the world in fundamentally distinct ways, shaped by their sensory capabilities and ecological contexts. For instance, a bat navigates its environment through…