Defending Dennett’s Theory of Consciousness: Subjective Experience Is Nothing Special

A common criticism of Daniel Dennett’s theory of consciousness centers on the supposed difficulty of explaining subjective experience, or qualia — the “what it’s like” aspect of consciousness. Critics, often pointing to David Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness, argue that Dennett’s functionalist approach neglects the mystery and uniqueness of subjective experience. However, I argue that these criticisms are misplaced, because subjective experience is not special in any metaphysical sense. There is no “hard problem” to solve, and Dennett’s framework provides a sufficient explanation of consciousness.

1. Subjective Experience Can Be Explained by Physical Processes

Dennett’s theory posits that subjective experiences arise from the physical processes of the brain. While it may seem mysterious that consciousness accompanies these processes, there is no need to posit something beyond the brain’s functioning, such as a non-material soul or “ghost in the machine.” The brain’s information processing, neural connections, and biochemical reactions are sufficient to explain why we experience sensations, emotions, and thoughts.

Critics often claim that subjective experience cannot be reduced to physical explanations…